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Abstract 
In recent years the European power system has changed 
significantly, causing the system to be operated closer to 
the limits. The transition to more renewable generation 
is causing power injections at different locations from 
conventional generation. Secondly the integration of 
the internal electricity market is causing an increase in 
flows on interconnections between different areas of the 
European power system. Furthermore the time needed 
to construct new infrastructure pushes Transmission 
System Operators (TSOs) to better utilize the installed 
infrastructure. As the power system is strongly 
interconnected, a contingency in one area can affect the 
whole power system and possibly lead to a wide area 
black out. Therefore adequate defence plans need to be 
designed and in place to handle these situations. This 
paper starts with an overview of the terminology used in 
defence plans. Subsequently the current status of defence 
plans in Europe and the preferred sequence of actions 
to mitigate contingencies, is given based on a survey 
conducted among several European TSOs. Furthermore 
his paper gives an overview of how the ongoing changes 
with renewables, phasor measurement units (PMUs), 
power  flow controlling devices and demand side 
response can affect the adequacy of defence plans.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the European energy system has 
experienced significant changes, the most outstanding 
ones being the increased integration of renewable energy 
sources (RES), utility unbundling and the development 
of an internal electricity market (IEM) [1]. By 2020 the 
EU is targeting RES to provide up to 34% of electricity 
production and is aiming to extend the low carbon 
strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% 
by 2050 [2][3]. Both the large penetration of RES, which 
are often not located near load centres (e.g. Offshore 
wind farms), and the integration to an IEM have 
increased transnational power exchanges. As the general 
public is not in favour of installing more transmission 
assets, system operators are forced to operate the systems 
closer to their limits. Furthermore, due to the stronger 
linking of the national power systems a disturbance in 
one area, if not handled adequately, is more likely to 
affect other parts of the system. Additionally the shift 
towards more controllable devices and RES is causing 
the system dynamics to change. This is because these 
generation units are generally connected through power 
electronics, which do not deliver the same response to 
system disturbances. The power system is thus also being 
operated closer to its dynamic stability limits. As similar 
transitions are taking place in other parts of the world, 
operating the power system closer to its operational 
limits is becoming a global trend, which has translated 
in an increased risk on wide area blackouts. A worldwide 
overview of registered blackouts is depicted in Table 1 
Frequency of outages [4-7]. A here considered wide area 
blackout affects at least 1000 people, last at least 1 hour 
and 1million person-hours of disruption.
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2. Defence Plans & Special 
Protection Systems
2.1. Stability phenomena leading to system 
deterioration
The power system is designed and operated to be able to 
cope with a number of predefined credible contingencies 
(e.g. N-1 events such as a line or generator outage). 
If such a contingency takes place, the power system 
is able to return to a stable operation point. It is also 
possible that the system is subjected to a contingency 
which is not conceived as credible and which is more 
severe (e.g. a multiple line or generation outage). When 
extreme contingencies disrupt the interconnected power 
system, the post disturbance effects can lead to a number 
of distinct types of power system breakdown. In the 
majority of cases the breakdown is related to instability 
(rotor angle, frequency or voltage) or cascading line 
tripping [4]. Breakdown can only be avoided by the 
timely control of these post disturbance phenomena. In 
order to protect the system, it is of primary importance 
to understand each of the phenomena involved in system 
collapse. Therefore it is key to keep the time horizon 
for the propagation of these issues in mind as this will 
determine the time available to mitigate the issue [14].
•	 Rotor	 Angle	 Stability:	 The	 ability	 of	 synchronous	
generators of an interconnected power system to 
remain synchronous after a disturbance. It can be 
divided into small-disturbance angle stability and 
transient stability (following a large disturbance such 
as a short circuit).
•	 Frequency	Stability:	The	ability	of	the	power	system	to	
reach and maintain a stable operating point following 
a severe disturbance resulting in a significant 
unbalance between production and consumption 
[14][15]. In large interconnected power systems this 
type of stability is mostly associated with the loss of 
multiple generation units (multiple contingencies) or 
the splitting of the system into unbalanced areas.
•	 Voltage	Stability:	The	ability	of	the	power	system	to	
maintain acceptable voltages at all buses in the system 
after a disturbance. Voltage stability depends on the 
ability of the power system to supply the active and 
reactive load.
•	 Static	 and	 Transient	 (Thermal)	 Overloads:	 The	
Table 1 Frequency of outages [4-7]
Traditionally these issues were addressed by a defence 
plan which was designed at a nation or state level. Because 
current power systems cover more than one nation or state 
and because of the changes described above, these plans 
no longer guarantee the same adequacy. Therefore TSOs 
have made changes to these plans, but a wide variety 
of defence plans remains and also the coordination and 
harmonisation remain limited. On the other hand, the 
increasing use of technologies like power electronics 
connected renewables, phasor measurement units (PMU), 
high voltage direct current (HVDC) connections and the 
increased availability of data provide new opportunities to 
improve the existing defence plans.
Several technical organisations (CIGRE, IEEE,..) have 
realised the need for more detailed standards on defence 
plans and system protection schemes and have formed 
dedicated working groups [4] [7]. Similar initiatives 
related to special protection schemes have been taken by 
the North American Reliability Council (NERC) [8] [9]. 
In Europe, ENTSO-E has published recommendations 
for the implementation  of defence plans and SPS and 
their research and development road map describes 
further actions needed [10]. Also within the FP7 project 
iTesla, new rules and harmonisation guidelines for 
defence plan design are being investigated [11]. This 
paper summarizes the results of a survey which was 
conducted among the iTesla partners and combines 
the results of other surveys [12] [13]. It gives a review 
of the current status of defence plans, defence plan 
terminologies, future challenges and opportunities.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. The second 
section of this paper elaborates on the terminologies used 
in defence plans. The third section gives a description 
of the current status of operational procedures and 
defence plans in Europe. Section four continues with 
the upcoming challenges and potential improvements. 
Finally the conclusions are presented in section five.
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the trigger that activates the scheme. The scheme can be 
activated by a specific event, which is then called event 
based. An example can be a power plant connected via 
two lines to the rest of the system. In case of an outage 
of one of the lines, the generation unit is immediately 
curtailed or disconnected to avoid the remaining line 
being overloaded. Other schemes are activated based on 
a	system	response	to	a	contingency:	changes	in	voltage,	
frequency, etc. Here an example is the under voltage 
load shedding action. NERC uses the term Special 
Protection System or Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), 
which is an automatic protection system designed to 
detect abnormal or predetermined system conditions, 
and to take corrective actions in addition to the isolation 
of the faulted components.
ENTSO-E makes the distinction based on the issue the 
scheme is targeting. In that sense, system protection 
schemes focus on the stability problems described in 
section two of this paper, while special protection schemes 
are intended to operate for rare, but foreseeable events 
that could undermine the integrity of the grid. These are 
also called System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS). 
Subsequently, a system protection scheme is triggered 
by a system response, while a special protection scheme 
can be event or response based [11][12][13]. Many 
different schemes have been implemented by TSO’s and 
often different names are used for similar schemes.
Finally one should also make the distinction between a 
defence plan and a shortage plan. While the defence plan 
protects the power system against sudden unforeseen 
phenomena, the shortage plan describes how to handle 
foreseeable adequacy problems (a foreseeable lack of 
generation or transmission capacity to supply all the 
load in an area).
3. Current status of defence plans 
in Europe
As a starting point for the ongoing research on defence 
plans within the iTesla project, a survey has been 
conducted among the participating TSOs. After each 
TSO completed the survey, an in depth discussions on 
the given answers took place. This enabled knowledge to 
be obtained about the current practices of SPS integrated 
in the defence plans of the participating TSOs (mainly 
ability of the power system to supply all load 
without damaging or triggering the thermal overload 
protection of any of the power system elements.
2.2. Description of a defence plan
To protect the power system from collapsing, it is 
equipped with a multi-layer protection scheme.  The first 
protection layer is in the design. Sufficient redundancy 
is built in to manage the effects of an outage of a single 
element. Secondly, system elements are equipped with 
protection systems to assure no permanent damage is 
inflicted after contingencies. For example a flashover 
between a line and a tree will result in the temporary 
disconnection of this line by the distance protection. 
Thirdly a set of operational rules has been designed as a 
framework to ensure that credible contingencies can be 
contained by the system operators (e.g. manual actions). 
When extreme contingencies disrupt the power system, 
there is a last line of defence which is called the defence 
plan.
Cigré describes a defence plan as a set of coordinated 
automatic measures intended to ensure that the overall 
power system is protected against major disturbances 
involving multiple contingency events, generally not 
caused by natural calamity. The defence plan is used to 
minimize and reduce the severity and consequences of 
low probability and unexpected events and to prevent 
system collapse (prevent the progression to blackout 
state). Individual SPS, such as automatic generation 
run back schemes, load or generation rejection, load 
shedding, reactive switching, bus or system splitting, etc. 
are then regarded as coordinated elements used within 
a defence plan. ENTSO-E uses the same definition as 
proposed by Cigré [4]. ENTSO-E also uses a system 
state representation to identify when the defence plan is 
activated. In this approach, during system collapse the 
system evolves from normal state to alert, emergency 
and eventually blackout. The defence plan is activated 
on the transition from emergency state to blackout state 
[15]. 
Special and System Protections Schemes (SPS)
The defence plan is composed of several schemes 
intended to prevent instability. Several terms to 
describe these schemes are in circulation. One method 
to categorise them is to make the distinction based on 
Cigre Science & Engineer ing
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participating TSOs have installed. The majority of 
schemes installed focus on load shedding (LS). In the 
majority of cases these schemes intend to restore the 
frequency, though there are also several LS schemes to 
maintain voltage. The second most commonly installed 
schemes are generation rejection schemes (disconnection 
of a generation unit from the grid) and generation 
adjustment schemes (automatic re-dispatch). Most of the 
islanding schemes are installed to mitigate rotor angle 
instabilities. Blocking of on load tap changers (OLTC) 
is used to avoid the situation where a fault on MV or LV 
also pulls down the voltage of the transmission system.
3.1. Handling Frequency Stability
As described earlier a sudden change in frequency 
occurs when one or multiple elements trip, leading to a 
significant imbalance between load and generation. In a 
large interconnected power system, this type of situation 
is most commonly associated with a multiple generation 
outage or a situation following system separation, as was 
the case in Europe on the 4th November 2006 [5]. In the 
case of system separation, some of the areas will have a 
surplus of generation (over frequency), while others will 
have a deficit (under frequency). In the over frequency 
area, generation will need to be reduced. In the under 
frequency area new generation needs to be started up 
or load will need to be disconnected. As the frequency 
is a system parameter, not limited to a certain area, 
coordination on over and under frequency schemes is 
considered to a certain extent and general guidelines have 
been formulated. Generally the activation of specific 
actions is determined based on a frequency threshold 
(Sometimes the rate of change is also used). The order of 
actions is mainly determined by the economic and social 
impact of the action.
3.1.1. Under frequency scheme
The first protection against a frequency below the 
nominal frequency is delivered by the primary response 
of the generation units. The primary response in 
Continental Europe is able to cope with an event that 
causes a maximum deviation of 200mHz (or a power 
unbalance of 3000 MW ). This protection is part of 
normal operation. If the frequency deviation is bigger, 
from Western-Europe). The results are outlined and 
statistically categorised in this section.
In Figure 1 Types of Instability and distribution between 
event and response based schemes it is shown that for 
each of the instability issues, several protection schemes 
have been put in place. Each of the bars represents the 
relative number of schemes that are implemented for 
a specific stability issue. The colour of each column 
gives the distribution between response (blue-lower) 
and event based (red-upper) schemes. The majority 
of schemes are dedicated to resolving voltage issues, 
as voltage problems are more local and a larger set of 
measurements are available. The second largest number 
of SPS installed, target frequency instability. The 
number of schemes dedicated to rotor angle stability and 
overload mitigation are clearly lower. This figure also 
shows that the majority of triggers are response based 
(triggered when a power system parameter reaches a 
predetermined threshold).
Figure 1: Types of Instability and distribution between event and response 
based schemes
Figure 2 Types of SPS installed by the participating 
TSOs gives an overview of the types of SPS, that the 
Figure 2: Types of SPS installed by the participating TSOs
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the system operator can disconnect customers according 
to contractual arrangements, reduce the export on a 
HVDC line with another area, stop pumping storage 
units, start up new generation, or do soft load shedding. 
Contractual load shedding is carried out by reducing 
demand of clients who have made an agreement with 
the TSO which states that the TSO can reduce their 
consumption a number of times a year against a specified 
price. Reducing the export on a HVDC line has the same 
effect as disconnecting load, though this will shift part 
of the problem to the other area. Therefore, when using 
this action, coordination with the TSO of the other area 
is always needed. Operations of these lines are often 
predefined. Soft load shedding is done by reducing the 
voltage at the distribution side with 5 to 10%, which is 
assumed to be equivalent to a reduction of 2% of active 
load. With the increasing penetration of electronically 
connected devices, the efficiency of this action will 
decrease. Depending on the value of the frequency, each 
of these actions is activated manually or automatically. 
When the frequency drops below 49Hz the automatic 
load shedding plan will be activated. Each TSO is 
responsible for the design of these schemes (frequency 
thresholds and amounts disconnected) within its own 
area, though ENTSO-E policies describe that at 49Hz at 
least 5% of the load should be disconnected. Below 49 
Hz a linear load shedding scheme is advised [16]. Often 
the design of these schemes is done in close cooperation 
with the DSO, to be able to determine the high priority 
feeders (hospitals, communication facilities, military, 
etc.).
3.1.2. Over frequency scheme
A frequency between 50 and 50,2Hz is covered by normal 
operation as stated before. When the frequency rises 
above 50,2Hz manual and automatic power generation 
reduction will take place. This can either be done by 
generation adjustment schemes or by rejection (tripping) 
of generation. A generation adjustment scheme ramps 
down the generation output at a specific rate (%/Hz) 
if the frequency goes above a specified threshold (Ex. 
50,3Hz). With the increased penetration of renewables 
and HVDC connections, parts of the design of these 
schemes can be improved. In section IV this will be 
further elaborated.
3.2. Typical under/over voltage scheme
Most of the reactive power needed to maintain the 
voltage is usually generated close to the load centres. 
This to reduce the reactive power flows and hence losses 
Figure 3: Preferred sequence of actions to mitigate over voltages (relative weight between actions).
Figure 4: Preferred sequence of actions to mitigate under voltages (relative weight between actions).
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is implemented. If this action does not resolve the 
issue, a disconnection of the largest unit in the group 
of units that loses synchronism is often used. A final 
measure to prevent uncontrolled tripping is controlled 
islanding, where the system is separated into several 
non-synchronous zones. Some TSOs have implemented 
Out-of-Step relays at predefined location to execute 
this action, whilst others rely on the distance protection 
relays to separate the system at its natural points. As 
described before, most of the SPS covering rotor angle 
stability are islanding schemes.
3.4. Typical overload mitigation scheme
To resolve overloads on the system, most TSOs try to 
switch in extra system elements such as lines, transformers 
and cables. One TSO prefers the change of generation 
set points before changing the system topology, but with 
the unbundling this usually comes at a cost. Some TSOs 
also change the location of reactive power generation or 
adjust transformer taps to reduce reactive power flows 
on highly loaded lines. If the overload is located on a tie 
line, a solution is sought through direct communication 
with the TSO of the other area. An overview of the 
preferred actions is given in Figure 5 Preferred sequence 
of actions to mitigate overloads (relative weight) 
(*)Connect lines to increase system meshing.. The 
special protection schemes used to mitigate overloads are 
automatic generation rejection or adjustment schemes or 
line switching.
3.5. Coordination of defence plans
To execute a defence plan adequately at times when 
the system is under stress, it is important that there is 
good coordination between all stakeholders of the 
power system. Therefore system operators are trained 
in exercises on wide area incidents which include 
on the system. Therefore, generally a local solution for 
the voltage problem is preferred. Several actions are at 
the	 disposal	 of	 the	TSO	 such	 as:	 a	 change	 in	 reactive	
power set points for generation units, or the switching 
of shunt elements (capacitor banks, reactors, SVCs, 
STATCOMs, etc.). If these actions cannot resolve the 
voltage problem, the next step is to  isolate the problem 
in a specific area of the system. One method to do this is 
by blocking the on load tap changers. The voltage of the 
medium voltage system will remain low, but the voltage 
in the high voltage system will be restored to normal. 
Some TSOs cannot implement this action, as they have 
a lot of shunt capacitors installed at medium voltage. 
Blocking of OLTC would then increase the risk for 
overvoltage at medium voltages. An ultimate measure to 
maintain the voltage is to reduce the demand for reactive 
power by disconnecting part of the load. Of the above 
described actions usually the transition to a defence plan 
is made starting from the blocking of OLTC, although 
some schemes exist where a loss of a line triggers a 
change of set point for shunt elements. In Figure 3 
Preferred sequence of actions to mitigate over voltages 
(relative weight between actions). and Figure 4 Preferred 
sequence of actions to mitigate under voltages (relative 
weight between actions). an overview is given of the 
preferred sequence of actions for each of the TSO’s for 
an over and under voltage problem respectively. In this 
figure, each TSO gave a relative ranking of all possible 
actions according to their importance. Some TSO’s try to 
first solve the voltage problem with the shunt elements, 
as changing the generation set points can come at an 
extra cost.
3.3. Typical Rotor angle stability scheme
To avoid the loss of synchronism of a single generator 
or a group of generation units, sometimes fast valving 
Figure 5: Preferred sequence of actions to mitigate overloads (relative weight)  
(*)Connect lines to increase system meshing.
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behind each feeder and it has been shown that in several 
cases less than 5% was shed in the first stage of the 
UFLS scheme. Therefore several TSOs, have adapted 
their schemes to compensate for the loss of embedded 
generation, by shedding more load in the first step of 
the scheme. But this further prevents the equal spreading 
of load shedding between different areas and causes a 
larger impact than needed to mitigate the contingency. 
Therefore a more intelligent UFLS scheme needs to be 
developed.
Figure 6: Load shedding scheme advised by ENTSO-E
4.1. Power Flow Controlling devices (PFC)
One of the changes in the power system is the increased 
installation of PFCs, such as phase shifting transformers 
and HVDC lines. HVDC lines can provide a fast response 
to changing active and reactive flows in the system and 
therefore can be used to respond quickly to overloads, 
power swings and voltage problems. Nevertheless, their 
use in defence plans has until now been rather limited. 
The reasons for this are that a limited number of PFCs 
are installed and cross border operation can benefit one 
area, but have an adverse influence on the neighbouring 
area. Therefore, focussing on HVDC interconnectors, 
the control actions are generally done manually and 
often after consulting the neighbouring TSO. For 
Example, an HVDC interconnector is operated with a 
bilateral agreement in place for emergency situations, 
specifying that the import can be ramped down to zero 
or up to maximum without changing the direction of the 
flow, when there is an over or under frequency problem 
respectively. To change the direction of the flow, a phone 
call has to be made to the neighbouring dispatching 
centre. This causes part of the technological benefit to 
cooperation with other parties such as other TSOs 
in the same synchronous area, DSOs and generation 
companies. For most TSOs, this training takes place 
every two years. For events which have an influence 
outside of the TSO’s own region, agreements should be 
in place for adequate and appropriate actions to be carried 
out. These events can be the outage of an element or the 
activation of an SPS that causes a violation of system 
parameters in a neighbouring system, such as overloads, 
voltage or frequency problems, etc. An example could 
be the automatic change of an HVDC set point, causing 
a frequency change in another synchronous area. To 
mitigate overloads, all TSOs have bilateral contracts 
with generation companies. In the case of serious 
congestions, agreements are in place with neighbouring 
TSOs on congestion security management (CSM). Also 
with the increased penetration of distributed generation, 
there is a need for an increased coordination with the 
DSOs. In regions with large amounts of distributed 
generation it has been ascertained that automatic load 
shedding actions can disconnect more generation than 
load, thus resulting in the opposite to desired effect. To 
facilitate coordination, direct communication via phone, 
mail and fax takes place.
4. Further harmonization of 
defence plans: issues and 
solutions
The current harmonisation of defence plans has mainly 
been targeting under frequency load shedding plans, as 
they affect all areas of an interconnected synchronous 
grid. As stated before, ENTSO-E advises a linear load 
shedding scheme in Europe and obliges the TSOs to shed 
at least 5% of load, if the frequency drops below 49Hz 
(Figure 6 Load shedding scheme advised by ENTSO-E). 
But there is still a lot of variation in UFLS schemes after 
the initial step [17]. This paper gives an overview of a 
number of the installed under frequency load shedding 
schemes in Europe and the interaction between them. It is 
clear that if the schemes are not identical, the areas with 
the largest load shedding step at a specific threshold, will 
carry the largest burden. Also the transfers to or from 
this area can change significantly. Furthermore, because 
of increased penetration of RES, in some areas it has 
become more difficult to estimate the amount of load 
Cigre Science & Engineer ing
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necessary to ensure that the algorithms used to initiate 
protection actions are reliable and robust. Also the PMU 
data transfer from different areas must be reliable enough 
and the quality of the data good enough. As PMUs are 
dependent on satellite synchronization it should also be 
noted that this causes an inherent vulnerability in the 
measurements.
4.3. Impact of Renewables
The goals set by the EU have resulted in a significant 
increase in renewable generation units connected to the 
power system. A large penetration of wind generation 
(WG) might have considerable impacts on defence plans 
for frequency and voltage stability. Paper [21] gives an 
overview of these problems. For frequency stability it 
makes clear that the partial replacement of conventional 
generation with WG will result in erosion of system 
inertia, which results in increased rates of change of 
frequency (RoCoF) during events and possibly unwanted 
trips of RoCoF relays. Therefore research is looking 
at supplementary control strategies to provide inertial 
response with WG and to make WG emulate primary 
or droop control to contain low frequency. If the drop 
in frequency is large, under frequency load shedding 
might be required to prevent frequency instability. 
However, traditional load shedding schemes may not be 
efficient with high penetration of distributed renewable 
generations.  Therefore, advanced load shedding schemes 
considering distributed generation need to be developed. 
Similarly for over frequency situations, the fast active 
power control capability of modern wind turbines 
(WTs) is a relevant option, as converter connected WTs 
can be down regulated much faster than other types of 
generators. WG can deliver and absorb reactive power 
for short period to alleviate voltage stability issues. 
Although variable speed wind turbines can support 
voltage stability by regulating reactive power, the 
limited capacity of the partial scale converter in DFIG 
turbines results in a voltage control capability which 
cannot emulate a synchronous generator. Furthermore, it 
is also very important to look at the reserve requirements 
with high penetration of renewables. Dynamic reserve 
deployment instead of static reserve may be a better 
option to handle imbalances caused due to forecast 
errors. The forecast error  decreases as the time horizon 
moves closer to real time, but can still be as high 
as 100%. This is mainly due to the inaccuracy of the 
be lost (fast response). Although automatic reduction or 
ramp up scheme also exists. Some DC lines are installed 
with pole tripping schemes to avoid AC overloads. 
Also, as the number of DC lines is increasing, a more 
harmonised approach is needed as bilateral agreements 
will no longer suffice. In paper [18] it is shown, that for 
embedded HVDC lines (within a synchronous area) a 
more centralised approach can for example lead to higher 
flow transfers between areas in the power system, and as 
such deliver an extra safety margin to the power system 
and protection against cascading outages. But the full 
benefit is only achieved through automation of the control 
actions. To be able to use these controllable  devices 
in automatic system protection schemes, new control 
methodologies and guidelines need to be developed. To 
be able to implement these methodologies, it is crucial to 
have a wide area view on the system in real time.
4.2. Phasor Measurement Units(PMU)
PMUs provide high accuracy time-synchronized 
information of the power grid variables (e.g. voltage, 
current, frequency, rate-of-change of frequency) [19] 
in different areas of the system, and can thus be used 
to observe oscillations, voltage levels and frequencies 
in different areas. Therefore, after further processing, 
PMU information could be used in response-based 
system protection schemes of various stability types. 
PMU information can also be used in detecting islanding 
situations. However, as became clear from the survey, 
some of the European TSOs stated that PMU information 
is not yet utilized in defence plans against different 
instability phenomena that can occur in the power 
system. The PMU information could possibly be utilized 
in the defence plans to provide a triggering signal in SPS 
when the measurements are processed appropriately. In 
paper [20] a defence plan methodology against voltage 
instability was developed, a test system implemented in 
simulation software, and the methodology tested in the 
test system. The methodology is based on calculation 
of sensitivities with linear regression, and it is capable 
of determining an impeding long-term system collapse. 
Benefits of the method are that the network topology and 
dynamic models are not required, difficulties related to 
filtering techniques are avoided, and intrinsic time delays 
from using filtering methods are eliminated. In utilizing 
PMU information in defence plans in the future, it is 
Cigre Science & Engineer ing
14
the world. Thereafter an overview is presented of the 
phenomena which play a key role in the stability of a 
power system in emergency. Subsequently an overview 
has been given on the current practice of defence plans 
and SPS in Western Europe to form a starting point for 
further harmonization and coordination of defence plans. 
From the analysis, it has become clear that defence 
plan designs originated from a national approach. Most 
schemes are response based and focus on voltage related 
issues. Until now the most harmonized scheme is the 
under and over frequency scheme, which uses load 
and generation rejection schemes respectively. As part 
of the analysis an overview of the preferred sequence 
of actions for each of the participating TSOs has been 
given. The differences between TSOs generally depend 
on the installed system elements and contracts made 
with generator companies. It has also become clear that 
the use of PMUs is still limited to post mortem analysis. 
In the last decade, the adequacy of the current schemes 
has become more and more under pressure due to 
several changes taking place in the power system. The 
final section points out how these changes impact the 
adequacy of the current defence plans and where more 
research is needed. Here the main focus has been on the 
impact of distributed energy sources on UFLS schemes, 
the potential of using PFCs and PMUs, the impact and 
possibilities of improved control of renewables and 
demand side response. Currently TSOs are making 
adjustments to their UFLS schemes to take distributed 
generation into account (larger initial LS steps), though 
this method cannot be applied if the penetration further 
increases. For HVDC lines the number of installed 
control schemes remains limited and activation is 
mostly manual. Therefore new automatic control 
methodologies need to be developed to use the full 
potential of this technology. In order to assure the use 
of PMU devices in defence plans, the algorithms which 
are used to initiate protection actions need to be reliable 
and robust. To assure the further integration of WG in 
the system without jeopardising system security, it is 
necessary to define reserves dynamically and to design 
supplementary control strategies to provide inertial 
response. Also with regard to distributed energy sources, 
the impact on UVLS- and UFLS-relays should be 
reviewed. Another approach to deliver inertial support is 
by applying demand response, such as the smart control 
meteorological forecast [22]. Therefore, if reserves are 
defined statically instead of dynamically, it will require 
a much higher capacity of automatic reserves to be 
committed and deployed, which will remain unutilized 
for most of the time.
4.4. Demand Side Response (DSR)
Demand Side Response represents a promising 
contribution to smarter power system operation and at 
the same time improve network security under future 
scenarios characterised by large amounts of renewable 
energy sources. In fact, during normal operation, one 
can manage the devices’ power consumption, shifting 
demand from peak to off-peak hours in order to re-shape 
system demand profile. DSR is also becoming a solution 
to the problem of lack of system inertial response 
introduced by wind turbines. The ability to disconnect 
distributed loads already within the inertial response 
time window testifies the possibility for demand 
response to provide effective inertia.  Specifically, we 
have considered the smart control of thermostatic loads 
(TCL). In this application, each “smart” load identifies 
the frequency deviation and, according to the particular 
algorithm implemented, adjusts its power consumption. 
In case of a generation shortage resulting in a frequency 
drop, the devices will tend to switch off in order to quickly 
reduce the power imbalance. Current research [23] 
quantifies the impact on system security of the inertial 
support provided by controlling thermostatic loads, even 
though the conventional definition of an inertial constant 
does not apply to these appliances. Moreover it is shown 
that the increased “effective system inertia” resulting 
from the demand response allows the system operator 
to integrate a large share of RES which would otherwise 
be curtailed. The recovery pattern of TCLs has to be 
controlled to not cause a negative impact the network 
operation. A basic but effective control strategy in [24] 
avoids the need to synchronize individual devices and 
drastically reduces and postpones additional energy 
costs. More robust control strategies will be required to 
increase demand side reliability.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides an overview of the different 
terminologies used in defence plans in order to clarify 
the multiplicity of terms for these schemes in use around 
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of thermostatic loads. The increased “effective system 
inertia” resulting from demand response allows the 
system operator to integrate larger amounts of RES which 
would otherwise be curtailed. Finally it is important to 
notice that experienced and well trained dispatchers are 
a complementary necessity to operate the power system 
in a secure way. Therefore sufficient training on wide 
area system disturbances, involving several TSOs and 
DSOs, should take place on a regular basis.
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